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"Today, the First Amendment has become a first line of legal attack."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), held that the 1984 Cable Communications Act's
(Cable Act) must-carry provisions were constitutional regulations of the
marketplace.2 In its earlier decision, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC (Turner 1),3 a fractured Court determined that the must-carry provi-
sions were content neutral and subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny
but failed to ultimately determine the constitutionality of the provisions-
instead remanding the case for further factual development.4 When the
case returned, Justice Breyer had replaced Justice Blackmun on the bench.
Nevertheless, the Turner I Court again issued an occasionally caustic and
severely splintered ruling, narrowly holding that laws requiring cable sys-
tems to carry local broadcast programming were content neutral. The jus-
tices strongly disagreed about the means to determine content neutrality
and about the purpose of the must-carry laws. Despite acknowledging that
Congress expressly designed must-carry to encourage local and educa-
tional programming and to ensure diversity of voices in the video market,
a plurality of the Supreme Court said the law's purpose was to structure
the economic marketplace, not to stifle or compel speech.5 Justice
O'Connor's stinging dissent challenged the Court's holding and its ration-
ale, suggesting Justice Breyer's concurrence was actually a dissent and
therefore the panel below should be reversed.' The fractured decision of-
fered little guidance to lower courts seeking a consistent test to determine
the constitutionality of purportedly structural regulations of media.
The Supreme Court earlier rejected another opportunity to establish a
1. Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1016, 1024 n.27 (1997).
2. Turner Brdcst. Sys., 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. Previously, on
direct appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded the case for factual development of the record. Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]. On remand, a three-
judge panel granted summary judgment for the government and Commission. 910 F. Supp.
734 (D.D.C. 1995).
3. Turner1, 512 U.S. 622.
4. Id.
5. Turner!!, 117 S. Ct. at 1188.
6. Justice O'Connor argued that Justice Breyer had not joined the majority because his
concurrence relied on distinct, and conflicting, reasoning. Id. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
7. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REv. 297 (1997) (scrutinizing the inconsistent analysis of statutory purpose in intermediate
scrutiny).
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constitutional standard of review for structural regulations of telephone
companies. Rather than decide whether the First Amendment prohibits a
federal statutory ban on telephone company provision of video to its sub-
scribers, the Court asked the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine
whether the case was made moot by passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act), which repealed the challenged provision of
the Cable Act.9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the question
moot and left telephone companies, like cable operators, with little under-
standing of their constitutional status."0
In the meantime, other courts face an increasing array of constitu-
tional challenges from new First Amendment players grappling with fed-
eral regulations that distinguish among and differentially constrain the
business operations and services of communications industries.' Courts
continue to confuse the constitutional protection of communications in-
dustries and will undoubtedly cite Turner !!just as they have cited Turner
I as justification both to sustain and to overturn the constitutionality of
media structural regulations.'2 Thus, this Article maintains that the consti-
tutional question at the heart of the First Amendment challenges to the Ca-
ble Act ban on telephone company provision of video is not moot. Rather,
this Article examines the context and content of the Cable Act-telco cases
8. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996) (vacating
and remanding for consideration of mootness).
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 302(b)(1), 110 Stat.
56, 124 (West Supp. 1997) (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533 (b)).
10. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., Case No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr.
17, 1996) (vacating as moot telephone company constitutional challenge to 47 U.S.C. §
533(b)). Between 1993 and 1996, more than a dozen federal courts ruled 47 U.S.C. §
533(b) unconstitutional.
11. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1023 (suggesting the Turner rulings will "inspire
First Amendment challenges to all manner of economic restrictions on media."); Fred H.
Cate, Telephone Companies, the First Amendment and Technological Convergence, 45
DEPAUL L. Rv. 1035, 1036 (1996) (arguing that the constitutional question is not moot
because of technological convergence and industry-specific regulation); see also, e.g.,
NCTA OVS Appeal Focuses on Cable System Rights to Launch Service, COMM. DAILY,
Aug. 29, 1996, at 2 (discussing the NCTA constitutional challenge to FCC's open video
system rules).
12. Cf. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying intermediate scrutiny because "neither the rules nor the statute are predicated on
the ideas expressed in cable programs" and sustaining the constitutionality of public, edu-
cational, and governmental (PEG) programming, leased access, and other provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994))); US West,
Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny
because "Congress does not appear to have enacted § 533(b) based on the content" of video
programming and striking down the telephone-cable television cross-ownership ban), va-
cated and remanded for consideration ofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996).
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to explore the power of the First Amendment to eliminate structural and
economic regulation of communications carriers. The consistency and
speed with which lower courts affirmed telephone company First Amend-
ment rights; struck down decades-old rules excluding telephone companies
from the local video market; and ignored nearly a century of statutory and
common law excluding common carriers from content control suggests the
fragility of regulation of communications firms premised purely on
changeable market conditions. Indeed, as Frederick Schauer argues, the
First Amendment appears to be a uniquely effective tool in the legal mar-
ketplace.'3
The effectiveness of constitutional assault on the video programming
ban is illustrated by contrasting this approach with previous ineffectual
economic challenges to the structural regulations. Thus, Part II outlines the
long history of fruitless telephone company attempts to eliminate the ban.
In juxtaposition, Part I surveys the rapid and unanimous success of First
Amendment arguments against the ban. Part IV then outlines how the tele-
phone companies refrained themselves as speakers whose opposition to the
ban was constitutional, not economic. This transformation, Part V sug-
gests, coincided with and was abetted by deregulatory initiatives of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and Con-
gress. In the final Parts of the Article, the Author suggests that the power
of the First Amendment is impressive but far from certain, considering
court rulings may be influenced by powerful players and dominant public
policy positions.
II. STRUGGLING To ELIMINATE THE BAN
The recent use of the First Amendment to challenge the Cable Act
video ban represents the latest strategy in a long-standing battle. Tele-
phone companies had challenged the video programming ban virtually
from its 1970 inception' 4 as an FCC rule adopted out of fear that huge,
13. Schauer's discussion focuses on academics, but its implications for practicing law-
yers and the judiciary are clear. Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 853, 866 (1992); see also Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass
Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689 (1994) (arguing against a laissez-
faire free speech principle because of the ability of conservatives to "use" the First Amend-
ment to eliminate rational regulation); Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal
Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. RaV. 89 (1993) (noting, in part, that powerful clients in the legal
system can restructure the system to their own ends); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992) (examining the forces at
play in discretionary decision making by judges faced with constitutional questions).
14. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 850 n.3 (D.D.C. 1984).
Telephone company waiver requests to the Modified Final Judgment's line-of-business re-
strictions began January 26, 1984, with a request from Bell Atlantic to lease equipment
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powerful telephone companies would dominate the then-fledgling cable
industry. 5 The FCC said the rule, known as the cross-ownership ban,
would eliminate both the opportunity and the incentive for telephone com-
panies to discriminate in carriage and other terms of service against inde-
pendent cable video operators in favor of their own video affiliates. 6 In
1984, the Cable Act ban codified the FCC's established rule with virtually
no independent fact finding. 7 The record indicates that neither the FCC
nor Congress viewed the ban from a First Amendment perspective. The
dominant policy intent was to promote competition and increase regulatory
efficacy in a dynamic communications environment."
That was followed by a January 27, 1984, BellSouth motion to offer software programs and
related services; a February 8, 1984, Pacific and Nevada Bell motion to enter into foreign
businesses; a February 15, 1984, NYNEX request to provide office equipment; a February
24, 1984, BellSouth request to provide communications services and equipment to NASA;
and a March 20, 1984, US West request to engage in real estate transactions. Id.
15. Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facils. Furnished to Affiliated Community
Antenna TV Sys., Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, para. 43, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1549 [hereinafter Section 214 Final Report and Order], modified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1798 (1970).
16. Id. The 1978 Pole Attachments Act codified a portion of the FCC rule and pre-
vented discriminatory pricing for use of telephone poles. Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 35
(1978) (amending the Communications Act of 1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
224(b)(1) (1994)).
17. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4692
(reiterating the FCC's intent that the ban prevent local monopolies and encourage diverse
ownership).
18. See, e.g., The Communications Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 1822 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. (1994) (favoring enact-
ment of a bill to foster development of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure);
Oversight of Cable Television: Hearings on the Oversight of the 1984 Cable Telecommuni-
cations Act Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong. (1989) (examining competition in the video pro-
gramming industry); H.R. REP. No. 102-628 (1992); S. REP. No. 102-92 (1991), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133 (noting 11 hearings on cable television between 1989 and
1991); H.R. REP. No. 101-682 (1990) (favoring amendment of the Communications Act of
1934 to increase consumer protection and industry competition); see also Cable Competi-
tion Act, S. 1068, 101st Cong. (1989); Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1989, S. 905,
101st Cong. (1989); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1990, S. 1880, 101st
Cong. (1990); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1991, S. 12, 102d Cong.
(1991); Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, S.
1200, 102d Cong. (1991) (permitting telephone provision of cable service and video pro-
gramming); Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong. (1994) (deregulating tele-
communications and increasing competition and investment); Telecommunications Services
Enhancement Act of 1994, S. 2111, 103d Cong. (1994) (deregulating telecommunications
and encouraging development of a national infrastructure); National Telecommunications
and Information Administration Authorization Act of 1994, S. 1883, 103d Cong. (1994)
(allocating funds to promote and develop telecommunications infrastructure); Communica-
tions Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, H.R. 2546, 102d
Cong. (1991); Antitrust and Communications Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3626, 103d Cong.
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Yet the ban withstood years of FCC and congressional scrutiny and
repeated telephone company claims that changed economic and market
conditions eliminated the need for and utility of the ban.19 Market changes
that radically redefined telecommunications were overshadowed by policy
debate between those favoring unfettered competition as the means to effi-
ciently achieve public policy objectives and those arguing that (past and
present) monopolists required heavy government oversight. The regula-
tory/deregulatory debate masked a similar dialectic tension between free
speech and economic, structural regulation." Telecommunications policy
debate rarely recognized that common carriage might serve a dual func-
tion: to reduce transaction costs in the use of infrastructure and to enhance
21free speech .
(1994) (superseding the Modified Final Judgment and broadly amending the Communica-
tions Act of 1934).
19. FCC, OPP STAFF REPORT, FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP 162 (1981); see also,
Comm'n's Rules Concerning Carriage of TV Brdcst. Signals by Cable TV Sys., Report and
Order, 1 FCC Rcd. 864, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 792 (1986), modified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 3593, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1251 (1987); Telephone
Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5092 (1987); Tele-
phone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849 (1988); Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership
Rules, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 70 (1992)
[hereinafter Cross-Ownership Second Report and Order], modified by Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order on Reconsideration and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
FCC Rcd. 244, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740 (1994); see also, e.g., Competitive Issues in the
Cable Television Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988); Cable Televi-
sion Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., pts. 1 & 2 (1990); Cable In-
structional Television and S. 1200 Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Modernization Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. (1992); Effects of Tele-
communications Mergers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992) (reforming telecommunications regulation but leaving intact the tele-
phone-cable cross-ownership ban); and proposed telecommunications reform bills: Cable
Competition Act, H.R. 2437, 101st Cong. (1989); Communications Competitiveness and
Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1993, H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., (1993); Communica-
tions Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, S. 1200, 102d Cong.
(1991); Cable Competition Act, S. 1068, 101st Cong. (1989).
20. Chairman Reed Hundt, Toward Regulation That Fosters Competition, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 265 (1994); see also Eli M. Noam, Principles for the Communications Act of
2034: The Superstructure of Infrastructure, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 317 (1994) (arguing that
competition between common and private carriers distorts the market and is unstable);
ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 113-71
(1971).
21. Noam, supra note 20, at 320. But see Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the
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Then, in the late 1980s, Robert Pepper pointed out the potential con-
flict between common carrier regulation and the First Amendment. In an
FCC planning paper, Pepper suggested that established First Amendment
protection of cable systems might logically invalidate regulatory constraint
of telephone company broadband networks if telephone companies pro-
vided cable-like content over their common carrier facilities.23 He also
questioned whether common carrier safeguards would become unconstitu-
tional when a carrier provided content, thus foreclosing telephone compa-
nies from entering into content.24
Without adopting Pepper's First Amendment reasoning, the FCC
formally recommended that Congress eliminate the cross-ownership ban in
the early 1990s. ' In its 1992 Second Report and Order on the Cable Act
cross-ownership ban, the FCC told Congress that elimination, not con-
tinuation, of the ban would "promote [the Commission's] overarching
goals.., by increasing competition in the video marketplace, spurring the
investment necessary to deploy an advanced infrastructure, and increasing
the diversity of services made available to the public.",2' Despite growing
policy consensus that regulatory inconsistencies between private and
common carriers distort economic markets and dissuade rapid develop-
ment of infrastructure, Congress failed to repeal the ban.27 In response, the
FCC introduced a series of cumbersome and evolving video dialtone rule
makings to permit telephone companies to provide video.21 However, "the
Comm'n's Rules and Regs. Relative to Community Antenna TV Sys., Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 39 F.C.C.2d 377, para. 39, 26 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 739 (1973) (noting the
dual role of the telephone-cable cross-ownership rules to foster both "increased competition
in the economic marketplace" and "increased competition in the marketplace of ideas").
22. FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED
BROADBAND NETWORKS, REGULATORY POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (authored by
Robert M. Pepper), 4 FCC Rcd. 1306 (1988).
23. Id. para. 75.
24. Id.
25. Cross-Ownership Second Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, para. 3, 71 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 70 (1992), modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsidera-
tion and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 244, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 740 (1994).
26. Id. para. 135. For Department of Justice support of the repeal, see Reply Comments
of the U.S. DOJ, to the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, First Report and Order
and Second Further Notice of Inquiry in CC Dkt. No. 87-266, at44 (March 13, 1992).
27. See National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of
1994, H.R. 3636, 103d Cong. (1994) (approving immediate sweeping communications de-
regulation); H.R. REP. No. 103-560 (1994) (finding that diversity in telecommunications is
best advanced through unfettered market operation). But see S. REP. No. 103-367 (1994)
(urging incremental changes and retention of local and national cross-ownership rules to
protect diversity in the telephone industry).
28. See Reporting Requirements on Video Dialtone Costs and Jurisdictional Separa-
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courts [took] the lead in rearranging the telecommunications industry.' 29
III. CHANGING THE LINE OF ATTACK
Although the telephone industry had been regulated as a carrier of
others' goods for most of a century, by the mid-1990s, telephone compa-
nies had assaulted regulations, which confined them to serve as pure vehi-
cles, with a barrage of lawsuits claiming a First Amendment right to pro-
vide content as well." Like the cable companies before them," the
telephone companies chaffed at the restricted role of transporter and
tions for Local Exchange Carriers Offering Video Dialtone Serv., Order Inviting Com-
ments, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,548, modified and adopted by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10
FCC Rcd. 11,292 (1995); see also Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, First Report and Order and Second Further Notice of
Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 300, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1613 (1991) [hereinafter Cross-
Ownership First Report and Order], reconsideration granted in part and denied in part by
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 66 (1992); Cross-Ownership Second Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 71 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 70.
29. Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Tele-
communications in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 53 (1993); see also, Pacific
Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded for consid-
eration ofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Il1.
1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me.
Dec. 8, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of
mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting
the ban and permitting the regional Bell companies to offer cable and other information
services). Some speculate that Chesapeake & Potomac was the regional Bell to initiate this
series of parallel lawsuits because it could bring suit in the 4th Circuit "rocket docket,"
known for the speed with which it renders judgments.
30. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), amended in part by
Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealed by Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)). The Mann-Elkins Act subjected telephone and telegraph
service to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
31. Pacific Telesis, 48 F.3d 1106; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. 1335; Ameritech, 867 F.
Supp. 721; NYNEX, 1994 WL 779761; US West v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D.
Ill.), affd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of moot-
ness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909; see also USTA
Wins Summary Judgment: U.S. Dist. Court Says All Telcos Can Offer Video Programming,
COMM. DAILY, Jan. 30, 1995, at 1; USTA, OPATSCO, NCTA Win Lawsuit to Lift Cable-
Phone Ownership Ban, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTivs, Jan. 30, 1995, at A19; Bell Atlantic
Files Brief. Industry Gears up for Supreme Court Argument on Telco Programming Ban,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 20, 1995, at 2.
32. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1993), va-
cated and remanded, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), summary judgment granted, 910 F. Supp. 734
(D.D.C. 1995) (upholding must-carry provisions of 1984 Cable Act), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1174
(1997); Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified by 837 F.2d
517 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Quincy Cable Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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moved to embrace a dual function as both content suppliers and carriers."
To effect this shift in status, telephone companies claimed they were being
unconstitutionally deprived of their right to speak by regulations the gov-
ernment claimed merely constrained the economic structure of the com-
munications industry.34
The telephone companies' First Amendment argument arose en
masse virtually overnight. It followed closely upon a variety of market
changes that boded ill for the continued growth of traditional telephone
company services, revenues, and technological developments that enabled
telephone to readily transport video programming." The local telcos were
asking the courts to take action "where Congress had failed or declined to
adapt telecommunications law to changing technological and economic
circumstances. Assertions of First Amendment rights were calculated to
expand the economic market of telephone companies. The telephone com-
panies wanted to speak to their network of customers through lucrative ca-
ble video.38
33. See generally Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DUKE L.J. 329 (concluding that the First Amendment does not prohibit exclusive fran-
chising or access requirements imposed on cable).
34. See generally Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Owner-
ship Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 401 (1989); Erin M. Reilly, Comment, The Tele-
communications Industry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 COMMLAw CONSP. 95 (1994);
Eric T. Werner, Comment, Something's Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone
Companies'Entry into Cable Television, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 215 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Pacific Telesis, 48 F.3d 1106; GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940 (9th
Cir. 1994); Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn.
1995); BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. 1335; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. 721; NYNEX, 1994 WL
779761; US West, 855 F. Supp. 1184; Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909. But see
Bert W. Rein et al., The Constitutionality of the FCC's Television-Cable Cross-Ownership
Restrictions, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1982) (summarizing an earlier petition for rulemaking
to the FCC on behalf of a television station and asking for elimination of the ban on televi-
sion and cable cross-ownership as an unconstitutional restriction of television companies'
First Amendment rights).
36. See generally Barrett, supra note 29 (providing an overview of the logic and utility
of current telephone-cable alliances).
37. Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 728.
38. The Supreme Court has ruled that video programming is protected speech. See,
e.g., Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (comparing cable
communications with traditional First Amendment speakers: newspapers, books, pamphlets,
and public speakers); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("[Cable] is engaged
in 'speech' under the First Amendment .... "); LEONARD LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS (1985) (containing a thoroughly documented discussion of the original meaning of
the First Amendment, and the conclusion that the amendment always allowed regulation of
some forms of speech). But see Cross-Ownership First Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 300,
69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &F) 1613 (1991), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part by
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 66 (1992). Despite FCC disclaimers, the video programming distributed by tele-
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The initial constitutional challenge to the Cable Act's ban on video
programming came when Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Vir-
ginia (C&P Telephone) brought suit in December 1992 against the city of
Alexandria, Virginia. The city had cited the Cable Act's ban as grounds for
its denial of the telephone company's req5uest for a cable franchise to pro-
vide a competitive cable video system. C&P Telephone challenged the
41ban as an unconstitutional denial of its right to free speech.
Both the federal district and the circuit courts ruled that the so-called
cross-ownership ban unconstitutionally restricted C&P Telephone's First
Amendment right to free speech.41 Both courts subjected the ban to the in-
termediate scrutiny test articulated in United States v. O'Brien42 and found
the ban failed to overcome O'Brien's requirements that content-neutral
regulations of speech4" (1) further an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest; (2) that the interest be unrelated to the limitation of expression
of views; and (3) that the incidental limitation of free expression be no
greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental interest." Both
courts accepted the government's interest as important and unrelated to the
content of speech, but focused on the third prong, finding that the ban was
unconstitutionally overbroad."
By 1995, a string of federal courts, unanimously applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny, found the ban unconstitutionally overbroad. In none of these
cases did the government dispute the telcos' claims that the ban abridged
speech.47 The government instead defended the ban as essential to promote
phone companies is indistinguishable from, and in some cases identical to, that distributed
by cable operators.
39. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917.
40. Id. at 911 (citing Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).
41. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot,
No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996); Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 932.
42. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
43. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 202 (4th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac,
830 F. Supp. at 917.
44. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
45. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 202; Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at
931-32.
46. Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), vacated and re-
manded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. United
States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp.
721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL
779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); US West v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Ill.),
affd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness,
116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake &Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909.
47. See, e.g., Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 214 (D.
Conn. 1995); BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1338 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at
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competitive and diverse local media ownership, and to prevent telephone
company anticompetitive practices. The courts dismissed government ef-
forts to analogize the ban to laws of general application which are subject
to only rational review.
The courts also clearly distinguished the Cable Act-telco cases from
precedents which upheld bans on newspaper and broadcasting cross-
ownership. 49 The courts reiterated that the scarcity principal was the foun-
dation for the Supreme Court's ruling in FCC v. National Citizens Com-
mittee for Broadcasting and provided no justification for the telephone and
cable cross-ownership ban.
While the courts found "a substantial governmental and First
Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through
multiple technology media,"'" they consistently cited Turner 1 52 to hold
that the government's market or antitrust concerns were insufficient to
shield the law from heightened First Amendment scrutiny.53 The courts
also turned to Turner I to justify independent court evaluation of the facts
purportedly supporting the ban.54 The courts refused to defer to congres-
sional judgment about the need for the ban because of vast changes in the
cable television market since the ban's 1984 enactment. In addition, the
congressional record failed to show independent congressional fact finding
about the need for and utility of the ban. In rulings focusing on the third
prong of the O'Brien test, the courts concurred that the government had
failed to prove that the ban advanced its intended goals with no greater
56burden on speech than necessary.
728; US West, 855 F. Supp. at 1191; Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917-18. But
see GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that constitutional
issue was raised untimely and reporting FCC's argument that ban was a legitimate structural
economic regulation).
48. See, e.g., Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 730; Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 191.
49. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding
newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership ban); see also Marsh Media, Ltd. v. FCC, 798
F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to broadcast and cable
cross-ownership rules).
50. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994), va-
cated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake &
Potomac, 42 F.3d at 191.
51. Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 726.
52. TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
53. See, e.g., Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 730 (citing Turner1, 512 U.S. at 640).
54. Id. at 734-35 (asserting the court's duty to independently assess the necessity of the
ban to achieve its stated goals).
55. Id.; see also, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
that rules that implicate First Amendment freedoms must be supported with factual evi-
dence, not unsupported theory, hypothesis, or speculation).
56. BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
The courts consistently sidestepped the thorny issue of reconciliation
of First Amendment freedom with common carrier regulation and judicial
precedent that categorically separates common carriage from content con-
trol.57 Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in affirming the
lower court's C&P Telephone ruling, mentioned the apparent tension be-
tween established common carrier principles and the assertion of First
Amendment rights by telephone companies. After concluding that physical
and market characteristics of cable justified regulation and that intermedi-
ate scrutiny should be applied to the content-neutral ban,58 the court said:
Although common carriers are not members of "the press" insofar as
47 U.S.C. § 202 precludes them from exercising editorial control over
the communications they transmit, the foregoing would nevertheless
seem applicable to Section 533(b), which restricts a class of speakers
from joining the press by operating, with editorial control and within
certain areas, cable systems.
This nonsensical statement appears to state that although Title II does not
define telephone companies as protected speakers and, indeed, proscribes
their exercise of editorial control over the messages they carry, the Cable
Act ban nevertheless unconstitutionally restricts this "class of speakers"
from exercising certain types of editorial control. The rest of the First
Amendment rulings in favor of telephone companies preferred to avoid
this imbroglio.
Yet at least one district court apparently would subject any regulation
of telephone companies to heightened scrutiny. In dicta, the district court
in Southern New England Telephone Co. v. United States noted that "even
if the statute was directed at non-speech activity... it must be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because it 'impose[s] a disproportionate burden upon
those engaged in protected First Amendment activities.""'6 Seemingly,
then, no regulation of any aspect of the operation of a telephone company
could be justified purely as rational, economic regulation.
Although the Supreme Court chose not to address the question of the
extent of a telephone common carrier's First Amendment rights,6' lower
courts consistently affirmed First Amendment protection of telcos. The
mere mention of the First Amendment by telcos effectively eliminated any
57. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), va-
cated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No.
93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996).
58. Id. at 192-96.
59. Id. at 196.
60. Southern New Eng. Tel., 886 F. Supp. at 217 (D. Conn. 1995) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986)).
61. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
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discussion by the government of the core premise and goal of common
carriage: to segregate content and carriage. Indeed, the Cable Act-telco de-
cisions render classification as a communications common carrier virtually
meaningless. By eliminating the distinction between speakers and carriers,
the courts opened the spectrum of telephone regulation to constitutional
challenge. In addition, the Cable Act-telco rulings may open the door to
more intrusive carrier-type regulation of any speakers or communications
technologies, subject only to intermediate--not strict-scrutiny.62
IV. REFRAMING THE PLAYERS AND THE QUESTION
A. Challenging the Mandated Silence of Common Carriers
Neither statute nor common law clearly defines common carrier.63
The Communications Act of 1934, which outlines the obligations of com-
munications common carriers, circularly defines a common carrier as
62. See Turner H, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1186, in which the Court applied intermediate scru-
tiny based on the plurality's opinion in Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (holding that
speaker- or medium-partial regulations are always subject to some degree of heightened
scrutiny). Some justices, led by Justice O'Connor, have alternatively argued that speech-
related regulation of cable must be assessed under strict scrutiny standards. Turner 11, 117
S. Ct. at 1208 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (arguing that Justice Breyer's view of the must-
carry rules as "speech enhancing" should have subjected the rules to strict scrutiny); Turner
I, 512 U.S. at 675 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Intermediate scrutiny as applied in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
has been established as the appropriate standard of review for regulation of cable. Most re-
cently, the Court adopted the O'Brien test in Turner I1 When compared to strict scrutiny,
the intermediate O'Brien test requires that regulation (1) address an "important or substan-
tial," rather than a compelling, government interest; and (2) be narrowly tailored, rather
than the least intrusive, means of achieving that interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (re-articulating the second O'Brien prong to require only that regula-
tion does not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the govern-
ment's legitimate interests"); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (holding that regulatory distinctions for
media are presumptively invalid unless justified by "some special characteristic"); Central
Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-579 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (warning against the expanded application of the intermediate
standard). Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that state-created monopolies enjoy no First
Amendment protection. Id. at 584.
63. The U.S. Code states that a "common carrier" shall be defined by common law.
Statutes, however, mandate that communications common carriers, such as telephone and
telegraph companies, shall provide access to anyone who can pay and shall not alter the
content of the senders' messages. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); see also FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter NARUC 1] (holding that common carriers may not
discriminate between two like customers); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
533 F.2d 601, 609-610 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter NARUC II] (deciding that common
carriers do not control the content they transmit).
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"[a]ny person engaged as a common carrier for hire." The FCC provided
a similarly unenlightening definition when it said a common carrier is "any
person engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the pub-
lic.,,"65
The common law is no more helpful. In National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC 1), a case cited by nu-
merous courts struggling with common carrier doctrine, the D.C. Circuit
defined a common carrier firm as a firm "that engages in common car-
riage."66 The NARUC I court also offered the functional definition that
common carriage arises from "hold[ing] oneself out indiscriminately to the
,,17
clientele one is suited to serve .... Thus, subsequent court and FCC de-
cisions focused on whether a firm affirmatively held itself out to offer
nondiscriminatory service to like customers."
In general, courts and regulators agreed that regulated common carri-
ers must provide access to anyone who can pay and may neither dissemi-
nate their own messages nor alter the content their customers send. Tele-
phone common carriers must: 1) offer their services to the general public;
2) permit subscribers to control the messages they send; and 3) engage in
interstate commerce. 9 Rather than attempt to define common carriage,
courts and the FCC instead delineated conditions that justified common-
carrier-type regulation. Common law established that control of common
carriers is justified to minimize disruption of public property, to assure the
greatest service to the greatest number of citizens, and to control monopoly
power and prevent abusive business practices." Thus, the 1934 Communi-
64. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 153(h), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp. 1997)).
65. 47 C.F.R. § 21.1 (1996). Historically, communications common carriers have been
required to (1) offer their services to the general public; (2) permit subscribers to control the
messages they send; and (3) engage in interstate commerce. See generally Midwest Video,
440 U.S. 689; Frontier Brdcst. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, 16
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005 (1958) [hereinafter Frontier Memorandum Opinion and Order].
66. ROBERT W. POOLE, UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 43 n.7 (1985) (citing NARUC 1, 525
F.2d at 633).
67. NARUCI, 525 F.2d at 641.
68. See generally Wold Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
NARUCI, 525 F.2d at 641-42; NARUC I1, 533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
69. See generally Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689; Frontier Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, 16 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005 (1958); see also NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at
641; NARUC H, 533 F.2d at 609; Industrial Radiolocation Serv., Report and Order, 5
F.C.C.2d 197, para. 19, 8 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1545 (1966) ("The fundamental concept of
a communications common carrier is that such a carrier makes a public offering to provide,
for hire, facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of the public who choose to em-
ploy such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing....").
70. See Section 214 Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
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cations Act contains a recurrent theme that communications carriers
should be regulated to serve the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity.
71
In light of this quasi-public character, free speech rights to communi-
cate over telephone wires generally were the exclusive province of the in-
dividual users of the telephone, 72 and extensive telephone regulation was
upheld as a reasonable means to advance the First Amendment right of
telephone users to have nondiscriminatory near-universal service and in-
terconnection.73 To protect the citizens' right of free speech, regulation
generally barred both the telephone system operator and the government
from control of telecommunications content.74
Historically, then, telephone and telegraph services were common
carriers75 while broadcasting was not.76 This distinction resulted from the
F) 1549, modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1798 (1970); see generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1994); American Trucking Ass'n
v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (upholding regulations of industry--as
a common carrier-against constitutional challenge); see also NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640-
641 (discussing the historically "public character" of common carriers). For communica-
tions common carriers the concept of operation in the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity dominated regulation. See Section 214 Authorization, Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 354, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 543 (1984).
71. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 104, § 151, 47 U.S.C.A. 151 (West Supp.
1997); Id. §§ 214, 310(d); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (sustaining legis-
lative policy on rates for grain elevators and introducing the leitmotif of the "public inter-
est').
72. Limited but notable exceptions to the autonomy of telephone callers include ob-
scenity and harassment.
73. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967) (asserting that the First Amendment legitimately advances
the free speech rights of the individual citizen against the power of media owners); Lee C.
Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regu-
lation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
74. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TowARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 18-20 (1994) (examining the economic and competitive disadvantages of cur-
rent common carrier regulations).
75. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-29 (outlining the services and charges of wire or radio com-
munications common carriers such as telegraph and telephone); see also Mann-Elkins Act,
ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1997)); Parks v. Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422, 424-25 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1859). Conven-
tional wisdom holds that telephone companies held themselves out as common carriers in a
quid pro quo for protected monopoly status. But see Roland S. Homet, Jr., "Getting the
Message": Statutory Approaches to Electronic Information Delivery and the Duty of Car-
riage, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1985) (arguing against this oft-repeated position and main-
taining that telephone companies functioned as common carriers prior to monopoly status
because of the logical linkage to other vital carriers of business materials, that is, trains and
telegraph).
Much common carrier regulation is designed to offset market imperfections. Coin-
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unique market conditions of the two nascent industries, not from any ex-
plicit functional distinction between the two communications services.
This experience-based categorization failed to provide explicit definitional
criteria to help determine the carrier status of emerging technologies, such
as cable." The resulting categorical confusion was exacerbated by rapidly
changing technologies and markets in the 1980s.
In response, the FCC attemgted to tie common carrier regulation to
actual or historical market power. This approach allowed the FCC to ease
regulation of select telephone providers but did little to justify the First
Amendment distinction between common carriers and speakers."
The absence of a clear meaning for the term "common carrier" of-
fered courts hearing the Cable Act-telco cases an opportunity to clarify the
nexus between speakers and carriers. Instead, the courts avoided the terrain
of common carrier definition, ignored a basis to rule that telephone com-
panies might not exert editorial control over their own communicative
channels, and muddied established First Amendment jurisprudence.
mon carriers, such as railroads and telegraphs, historically were viewed as natural monopo-
lies because the high cost of installation and the limited customer base made it economi-
cally impossible for competitors to enter the market. Although competition now exists in
long-distance telephone service, Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) continue to
exert market power over local telephone service within their operating areas. See ITHIEL DE
SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 95-98 (1983).
76. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 153(h), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp. 1997)); Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
77. See, e.g., TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); NARUC1, 525 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
78. See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Servs. and Facils. Authorizations, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d
308, paras. 100-01 (1979) [hereinafter Competitive Common Carrier Notice of Inquiry];
FCC MAJOR MATTERS REPORT 40 (1982); see also Cox Cable Comm. Inc., Memorandum
Opinion, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 110, para. 27, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1235 (1985) (applying the market power analysis to determine carrier status); Interna-
tional Competitive Carrier Policies, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, paras. 39-67, 59
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 283 (1985) (using a market power definitional strategy similar to Cox
Cable Comm.).
79. Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining "Common Carrier": The FCC's Attempt at De-
regulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501; see also General Tel. Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (reasoning that although CATV systems were neither broad-
casters nor common carriers, the common carrier status of telephone companies involved in
CATV service was determinative); General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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B. Blurring First Amendment Categories
Historically, the courts, Congress, and the FCC applied the First
Amendment's prohibition against restraint of free speech to each com-
munications medium either through analogy to or distinction from estab-
lished media." A trifurcated system of First Amendment jurisprudence de-
veloped" wherein telephony was virtually devoid of First Amendment
183protection, print media was sacrosanct, and broadcast and a broadening
array of newer electronic technologies were somewhat free from regula-
tion.4
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ."). While interesting, the ultimate resolution of the debate over
constitutional intent is less important to this Article than is the day-to-day interpretation and
application of that document to telecommunications. For relevant discussions of the philo-
sophical underpinnings of free press in America see, for example, ELLIOT D. COHEN,
PHILOSOPIUCAL ISSUES IN JOURNALISM (1992); LEVY, supra note 38; J. HERBERT ALT-
SCHULL, FROM MILTON TO MCLUHAN: THE IDEAS BEHIND AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1990).
81. For a discussion of how this premise has been called into question, see, for exam-
ple, DE SOLA POOL, supra note 75. Also, for a general discussion of the objectives of FCC
licensing, see DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA:
LAW AND POLICY FOR RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE AND THE NEW VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES 158
(2d ed. 1991).
82. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression, of course, must be as-
sessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it .... ") (citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1957)); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673
F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[C]ommon carriers are quite properly treated dif-
ferently for First Amendment purposes than traditional news media." (citing FCC v. Mid-
west Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973))). But cf. Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry Into
Video Services: A First Amendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 111 (1991)
(stating that the "blurring of the lines between content and conduit reflects the reality of
much of the nation's communications infrastructure"); Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Car-
riage: Approaches to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1071 (1992) (arguing that traditional First Amendment analysis of telcos is ill-
suited to the dispute involving their attempts to provide video services).
83. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (ruling it un-
constitutional to require newspapers to provide a right of reply). But see Competitive Com-
mon Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); Section 214 Final Report and Or-
der, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1549, modified by Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1798 (1970); Nichols, supra note 79.
84. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 82 (discussing the trifurcated regulatory system that
distinguishes among newspapers, broadcast, and cable); Barron, supra note 73 (asserting
that regulation is necessary to assure public access to monopolistic media).
Also note that certain types of speech (e.g. obscenity and libel) present separate
regulatory rationales, and their regulation may not pose constitutional questions. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (holding that a legitimate government inter-
est exists sufficient to prohibit dissemination of obscene material); cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (holding that government-mandated access to newspaper columns violated the First
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Telephone services fell outside the ambit of First Amendment juris-
prudence because the telephone was treated as an essential utility, not a
speaker.85 For print, the underlying theory was that all had access to the
press, and government intervention was unnecessary to effect an open-
market exchange of ideas." However, when speech was delivered by radio
or television via the scarce and public electromagnetic spectrum, regula-
tion which limited the owner's editorial freedom was constitutionally per-
missible to assure the First Amendment rights of the audience."
Courts extended the broadcast regulatory model in varying degrees to
other electronic media.8 From the outset, cable was an enigma. It was a
functional equivalent of television but did not rely upon the scarce spec-
trum.89 Courts feared the market power of cable but likened its program-
ming to newspaper content, a form of speech strictly protected by the First
Amendment.
The confusion escalated with the advent of video telephony in the
1990s. Regulatory distinctions became increasingly suspect as private and
common carriers became virtually indistinguishable. 9' Differential regula-
tion of telephone companies and cable operators seemed increasingly in-
equitable and conflict-ridden. 2 Video delivered over telephone lines con-
verged the three branches of First Amendment jurisprudence and presented
a new issue to the courts.
C. Raising a New Question
Although the FCC had spent years attempting to balance First
Amendment and common carrier doctrines, references to FCC debate, or
even more generally to common carrier principles, were notably absent
Amendment); Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (affirming a government
right to regulate access to scarce, licensed air waves); see also WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984) (presenting a graphic interpretation of
the meaning of the First Amendment).
85. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 75.
86. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
87. RedLion, 395 U.S. 367.
88. Turner1, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
89. Argued before the Supreme Court in January 1994, Turner I focused in part on the
appropriateness of "pigeonholing any communications industry in[to] a First Amendment
pecking order." Tony Mauro, Cable Industry Case Expected to be a Landmark, THE
RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1994 at 5; see also Linda Greenhouse, New Law Regulating Cable TV
Gets Skeptical Response from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994 at Al2.
90. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; see also Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 637.
91. NARUCI, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
92. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 74 (examining the economic and competitive
disadvantages of current common carrier regulations).
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from federal court decisions affirming telephone companies' First• 93
Amendment right to provide video telephony. This omission severed a
critical thread of policy because, prior to the mid-1990s, almost no com-
mon law precedent existed to support the assertion of editorial control by a
common carrier. Indeed, prior to the 1993 ruling of the U.S. District Court
in C & P Telephone, few courts had ever been asked to consider the extent
of First Amendment protection enjoyed by a traditional common carrier
when it also functioned in part as a private speaker.94
A handful of cases and FCC rulings suggests that a First Amendment
speaker may function in part as a common carrier.95 However, neither the
courts nor the FCC had explored the implications of the reverse: allowing
a regulated common carrier to assert autonomous First Amendment control
over a portion of its capacity.9'
93. Competitive Common Carrier Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); First Re-
port and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215 (1980); Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981); Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308; Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 187 (1982); Order on Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 54, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
735 (1983); Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Fourth Report and Or-
der, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1219 (1983), vacated and remanded sub
nom. American Tel. and Tel. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fifth Report and Or-
der, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204 (1984); Sixth Report and Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391, vacated and remanded sub nom. MCI Tele-
comm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As used herein, video telephony is a
broad term that subsumes video dialtone common carrier systems and video systems oper-
ated by telephone companies that offer both programming and delivery.
94. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of
mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting
the ban and permitting the regional Bell companies to offer cable and other information
services); see also Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(declining to address an issue raised on appeal by telephone companies to have the cross-
ownership ban declared unconstitutional); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
95. See, e.g., An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960
Mhz, Second Report and Order, 46 F.C.C.2d 752, paras. 34-35, 30 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 75
(1974), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 938, paras. 39-44 (1975); Commu-
nity Antenna TV Sys., First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, para. 16, 17 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1570 (1969) (holding that designation as a speaker and as a common carrier are not
mutually exclusive); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172
(1968) (citing respondent's argument that cable partakes of "characteristics both of broad-
casting and of common carriers but with all of the characteristics of neither .... "); Frontier
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, para. 8, 16 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005
(1958) (holding that one-way cable services are not engaged in common carriage because
the content is not under the control of the subscriber). But see NARUCII, 533 F.2d 601, 610
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that two-way cable systems are common carriers if customers
have explicit or implicit discretion over content).
96. See, e.g., Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fourth Further Notice
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In general, courts attempted to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of
structural regulations imposed on communications industries and to rest
holdings upon statutory grounds whenever possible.7 However, in 1977
the D.C. Circuit Court in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v.
FCC (NCCB)9 upheld diversity as a sufficient justification for the news-
paper and broadcast cross-ownership ban. In NCCB, the D.C. Circuit said
regulation of the scarce broadcast spectrum was justified and did not vio-
late the newspaper's First Amendment rights because it "neither mandates
nor prohibits what may be published" and is "an attempt to enhance the di-
versity of information heard by the public .... ,99 The court called a con-
stitutional challenge to the rule "ironic,"'"' ° and, in dicta that may prove
prescient, warned that regulated separation of media protected the full
editorial autonomy of newspapers:
[I]t may be that newspapers can not truly be free of government inter-
ference so long as they operate government licensed broadcast sta-
tions. An unsavory fact of life is that government has the power to
regulate expression by a "raised eyebrow" reminding the broadcaster
of the triennial government renewal process. A newspaper opens itself
. . . . .. .. 101
up to similar intimidation by affiliation with a broadcast station.
This language suggests that at least one judge believed the extension of
First Amendment protection to regulated communications firms could
erode the unequivocal nature of freedom of speech.
For most of the 1980s, the D.C. Circuit Court, the venue of many
telephone company suits, suggested that it legally was "constrained to turn
a deaf ear to these [First Amendment] complaints."'' 2 In a rather typical
response to a 1987 First Amendment challenge to restrictions of the Modi-
of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429 (1995).
97. See, e.g., Northwester Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 774 F. Supp. 11, 12 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting that the
First Amendment "argument adds nothing to the Regional Companies' claim of injury");
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 585-86 & n.273 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also General Tel. Co. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming, against a due process challenge, FCC re-
quirements that banned telephone companies from providing community antenna television
services unless they first offered independent CATV operators access to carriers' telephone
poles).
98. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
99. Id. at 954-55. While apt in many respects, this case is distinguishable at least on the
ground that broadcast precedents apply uniquely to that medium characterized by spectrum
scarcity. See TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994).
100. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 555 F.2d at 954.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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fled Final Judgment,0 3 District Court Judge Harold Greene said the chal-
lenge was without merit: "These [telephone] companies, which have never
been publishers, thus cannot bootstrap their own failure to make the
showing necessary for the relief of their obligations under an antitrust de-
cree into an infringement of their First Amendment rights."'"'
The district court cited FCC v. Midwest Video Corp."'5 and Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee (CBS) 16 as
establishing the principle that "common carriers are quite properly treated
differently for First Amendment purposes than traditional news media."' 07
Both precedents, however, are readily distinguishable from telephone
company constitutional challenges. In Midwest Video, the Supreme Court
held that the FCC could not impose common-carrier-type access require-
ments on cable operators who enjoyed "journalistic freedom."'0 8 Similarly,
in CBS, the Court affirmed that broadcasters enjoyed editorial autonomy
and, consequently, could not be required to carry paid editorial announce-
ments.' 9 The cases cited by Judge Greene to establish that speech protec-
tion shall not be afforded to common carriers instead represent the oppo-
site principle that common carrier regulation shall not be imposed on
speakers.
A question more analogous to telephone company First Amendment
challenges to the Cable Act ban was presented in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.' 0 The question before the
Central Hudson court was whether a state-created monopoly, which is the
subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection un-
der the First Amendment. The Supreme Court answered yes and ruled that
the utility had a constitutional right to promote its services through adver-
tising."' But the lone dissent of Justice William Rehnquist urged that those
constitutional rights be narrowly defined. Justice Rehnquist argued that
"[w]hen the source of the speech is a state-created monopoly such as this,
traditional First Amendment concerns, if they come into play at all, cer-
tainly do not justify the broad interventionist role adopted by the Court to-
103. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982).
104. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987).
105. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
106. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
107. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273.
108. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 707.
109. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., 412 U.S. 94.
110. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (ruling eight to one that a ban on promo-
tional advertising by the state's electrical utility company did not pass intermediate scrutiny
and was unconstitutionally overbroad). But see id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 567-68.
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day. ' '1 In arguing against application of the First Amendment to the utility
company, Justice Rehnquist warned that the Court's ruling "could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee .... 113
Beginning in August 1993, a string of federal courts ignored that
warning.14 Observers echoed Justice Rehnquist and expressed fear that the
extension of First Amendment protection to telephone companies would
adversely affect all First Amendment speakers. Mark Director and Mi-
chael Botein said the rulings might have "possible cataclysmic effects on
the entire market.""' 6 Others said the rulings "frayed [the] fibers of social
policy, economic reality, and constitutional constraint .... Asserting
that trifurcated First Amendment jurisprudence lay in tatters, scholars
urged reliance upon laws of general application, such as antitrust, to gird
the ongoing transformation of the media."'
V. CAPITALIZING ON AN OPPORTUNITY
Antitrust rulings in telecommunications, however, also were under
assault during the 1990s. Arguing that market conditions had changed
vastly, the RBOCs continued to attack and wear down constraints imposed
on them by the Modified Final Judgment that broke up AT&T in 1982."9
For example, early in 1995 Judge Harold H. Greene of the federal dis-
112. Id. at 585 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. See generally Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), va-
cated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth
Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323-
P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340
(4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting the ban and permitting the RBOCs to offer cable and other
information services); see also Bell Atlantic Files Brief, supra note 31 (quoting the Bell
Atlantic brief which states that "every one of the 16 federal judges who has considered the
question has concluded that the [video program ban] is invalid under the First Amendment'
(alteration in original)).
115. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 719 (1992).
116. Mark D. Director & Michael Botein, Consolidation, Coordination, Competition,
and Coherence: In Search of a Forward Looking Communications Policy, 39 FED. COMM.
L.J. 229, 235 (1994).
117. Id. at229.
118. See, e.g., William E. Lee, The First Amendment, Economic Power, and Judicial
Review, Presented Before the 23d Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Confer-
ence (Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1995).
119. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
120. Judge Greene was charged with oversight of the rules governing the post-
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trict court in Washington, D.C., permitted one RBOC to provide long-
distance video programming. 12 Telephone companies had argued that the
economies of scale in a national broadband network were critical to the
economic viability of telephone video efforts.'9 Some observers expected
similar court rulings to allow all local Bell companies to establish nation-
wide video networks, but it was Congress's passage of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, not court action, that effectively extended Judge
Greene's ruling to all telephone companies nationwide.'
Prior to the 1996 Act, amid nascent competition between telephone
and cable operators, the FCC initiated inquiries to determine how best to
regulate video telephony in order to minimize regulatory disparities be-
tween telephone and cable and to enhance opportunities for new serv-
ices. 24 In 1995, the FCC began to expand its video dialtone rules to permit
telephone entry into video programming as well as delivery.'
During that same period, congressional debate over the Telecommu-
nications Act expressed an intent to broadly deregulate electronic commu-
nications firms to ensure the economic benefits of competition. Aside from
the requisite number of references to diversity of voices, congressional de-
bate did not reflect a desire to deregulate as a means to enable telephone
companies to advance First Amendment interests in public discourse."'
Policy makers instead argued that telephone competition would counteract
the market power of cable monopolies and speed deployment of a na-tional broadband telecommunications network.12
divestiture Bell companies.
121. Mark Landler, Phone Companies Clear TVHurdle, N.Y. TIMfES, March 18, 1995, at
Al.
122. Id.
123. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
124. Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fourth Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429 (1995).
125. Id.; For an example of early scrutiny of the cross-ownership ban, see Telephone
Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849 (1988) (holding that greater participation of telephone com-
panies in providing cable services pursuant to appropriate safeguards created greater com-
petition in cable television service, and therefore, in greater public interest benefits to con-
sumers).
126. See, e.g., Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fourth Further Notice
of ProposedRulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429.
127. TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
128. Clinton Administration Information Infrastructure Task Force, The National Infor-
mation Infrastructure: Agenda for Action (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/nii/NII-Agenda-for-Action.htil>.
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VI. ANALYSIS
In the 1990s, the FCC, the courts, and Congress reconceptualized te-
lephony's regulatory status. An array of decisions transformed telephone
providers from passive, nondiscriminatory conduits to active speaker con-
duits but failed to determine how to reconcile telephone common carrier
obligations with newly established First Amendment freedoms or to dis-
tinguish between expressive and nonexpressive activities.' Yet it is self-
evident, as Jerome Barron has noted in another context, that "not all
[cable] activities are First Amendment fungible. Some [cable] activity has
characteristics that should invoke First Amendment protection, but much
does not."'30 The failure of policy makers to draw this difficult line may
have opened regulation of all telephone activities to First Amendment at-
tack.
Yet technological innovations during the 1990s blurred any historical
bright line between media and telephony, or speech and economic activ-
ity.' Although First Amendment jurisprudence long had distinguished
among speakers and applied different regulation to each according to its
unique characteristics, such distinctions became increasingly impractical
as technological convergence erased any "special characteristic"' that
distinguished one medium from another. Indeed, economic or technologi-
cal distinctions between video telephony and cable systems seemed arbi-
trary, speculative, or capricious.
Yet regulatory barriers to telephone entry into video delivery and
programming dissolved not because of a showing either that the market
had changed, or that regulations no longer advanced a legitimate govern-
ment economic objective, but because the courts displayed what Jerome
Barron has called "modish deference to even the faintest mention of the
First Amendment.' 34 Lower courts consistently upheld telco First
Amendment rights while ignoring common carrier precedent and govern-
129. Brenner, supra note 33.
130. Jerome A. Barron, On Understanding the First Amendment Status of Cable: Some
Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1495, 1504 (1989).
131. Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facils. Furnished to Affiliated Community
Antenna TV Sys., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1798 (1970) (holding that no telephone common carrier subject to the Communica-
tions Act could supply CATV service to the viewing public in its area unless a waiver of the
rules had been granted under specified conditions).
132. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 82 (detailing the theory and application of trifur-
cated First Amendment jurisprudence).
133. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
134. Barron, supra note 130, at 1504.
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ment concerns about market power.'35 The FCC simply followed the
courts' lead, and Congress codified the status quo.
VI. DISCUSSION
The Cable Act-telco cases embody a dramatic change in telephone
company strategy, but the success of these deregulatory efforts lies in the
well-documented power of the First Amendment. In recent years, promi-
nent First Amendment scholars have decried the power of the First
Amendment to stultify debate and truncate analysis in a variety of policy
136
arenas. Criticized as narrow, simplistic, and empty, First Amendment ju-
risprudence has been contrasted to "the kind of careful analysis of costs
and benefits that is practiced in virtually every other policy field in gov-
ernment."'137 Indeed, scholars argue that rather than facilitate wide-open
deliberations, "the First Amendment in legal and policy analysis has
been.., an analytical stopper, a chiller of discourse."
The Cable Act-telco cases bear this out. The mere mention of the
First Amendment foreclosed detailed exploration of the goals and effects
of the Cable Act ban, or of the intents and efficacy of common carrier con-
straints, or of the distinction between speech and economic activities.
In the hands of the telephone companies, the First Amendment be-
came a litigatory weapon to eliminate unwanted regulation and to redefine
the battlefield of communications regulation/deregulation. Here, both the
occasions for litigation and the terms of engagement reflected existing
distributions of power and resources, and helped those already advantaged
in other aspects of their business. 139 As "repeat players" in the litigation
game, telephone companies also sought the positive externalities that
would accrue from developing reputations as powerful adversaries.'4
The questions thus raised are political. Telephone companies seek
telecommunications deregulation not primarily, or even necessarily, to re-
135. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Minnea-
polis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. 575; Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
136. See Schauer, supra note 13; Robert M. Entman, Putting the First Amendment in Its
Place: Enhancing American Democracy Through the Press, 1993 U. CmI. LEGAL F. 61, 72;
Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 935, 951 (1993); Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 713; Sandra Braman, Information and So-
cioeconomic Class in U.S. Constitutional Law, 39:3 J. COMM. 163 (1989).
137. Entman, supra note 136, at 72.
138. Id. at 80.
139. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 713; Braman, supra note 136; Schauer, The
Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, supra note 136, at 950-51, 957.
140. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. CI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 80 (exploring the nonrandomization of
cases filed, settled, and litigated).
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duce government intrusion into the communications market. Rather, de-
regulation is desirable because it changes the mix of government influ-
ences,14 1 and shifts the locus of power toward those with power, resources,
and advantage. 142 The courts resolving the questions are both an instrument
and an embodiment of the existing social, economic, and political envi-
ronment.143
In that context, the courts logically chose to construe the issue before
them narrowly. Direct consideration of the constitutional question--that is,
which telephone company activities truly are imbued with First Amend-
ment rights-was not politically expedient and was not necessary to reso-
lution of the cases at hand. Again and again, the federal courts demon-
strated a willingness to view the First Amendment as a trump that obviated
the need for fundamental doctrinal analysis.
By relying on the First Amendment trump, the courts failed to pro-
vide guidance on how to distinguish between economic and expressive ac-
tivities, or to suggest mechanisms to replace the historical carrier/speaker
dichotomy that would permit more logical determinations of the rights and
responsibilities of various members of the electronic press. The courts
failed to offer a useful definition for common carriers that would help
clarify which communications entities qualify and under what conditions,
or to determine whether common carrier status is a self-imposed condition
or a regulatory mandate. The courts failed to determine what evidence is
necessary to justify regulatory distinctions, or to establish the degree of
deference that should be given to historical or contemporary administrative
judgment when the two conflict. The courts consistently failed to demon-
strate how extension of First Amendment protection to video telephony
conformed with precedent or furthered the goals of free expression.
Certainly, the Cable Act-telco cases raise difficult issues. The uncer-
tainty inherent in industries and markets undergoing rapid and extensive
transformation exacerbates the difficulty of fact finding that should under-
lie rational, legal decision-making. Available data are largely speculative,
predictive, and incomplete. Yet the decisions that spring from these data
may aid or handicap the development of unforeseen services.
Thus, courts, regulators, and Congress face a conundrum. Decisions
of potentially enormous impact must be made within an historical frame-
141. See Entman, supra note 136.
142. See Sandra Braman, Horizons of the State: Information Policy and Power, 45:4 J.
COMM. 4 (1995) (discussing information policy as an exercise of state power); Schauer, The
Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, supra note 136, at 951.
143. See, e.g., Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic
Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315 (1995); Frederick Schauer, The
Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 729, 737 (1992).
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work ill-suited to contemporary conditions and based on partial informa-
tion supplied by parties with vested interests. Moreover, technological,
economic, and regulatory uncertainty increase the likelihood of error and
the uncertainty ofjurists.
The telephone companies, however, were certain. The telephone
companies knew what could have been gained through successful litiga-
tion. They understood the failure of prior efforts to eliminate regulations
based upon claims of changes in the marketplace or in technology. The
telephone companies had the power, the resources, and the ability to
choose to pursue their goals in the courts using the First Amendment
hammer.
Exercise of power in the legal marketplace is not inherently problem-
atic. When power arises from superior knowledge, efficiency, or quality,
its exercise-even in contravention of established public policy-may in-
crease social welfare and benefit the public. However, when power results,
even in part, from government grant, the exercise of that power is unfet-
tered from market demand. Accession to such power may undermine pub-
lic policy and ill serve the public, particularly when politicization of the
courts undermines the ability of the judiciary to police and protect the in-
terests of the powerless.
It falls outside the purview of this Article to explore whether the out-
come of the Cable Act-telco cases serves, or disserves, public policy ob-
jectives. Rather, the goal herein is to identify the new-found constitutional
weapon of telephone companies, and to suggest that the First Amendment
presents a real, and a substantial, threat to established, economic-based
regulation of communications firms. The Cable Act-telco cases demon-
strate the power and the efficiency of First Amendment arguments to
eliminate constraints imposed by Congress, and offer a timely example of
the creative use of the law to elude regulation in a rent-seeking environ-
ment.
Congress too is caught in the web of complex issues and of conflict-
ing goals of powerful players. The Telecommunications Act solved none
of the problems underlying the Cable Act-telco cases; it simply shifted the
battlefield. Policy makers wishing to give the government a stronger de-
fense against constitutional arguments seeking to unravel the Telecommu-
nications Act should seek to justify regulations on both economic and
speech grounds.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Cable Act-telco cases effectively were over once the telephone
companies transformed themselves into speakers, and the statute's market
constraints into abridgements of free speech.' 44 Indeed, the cases demon-
strate the "strange power of speech"' 45 to efficiently open markets to com-
petitive entry when the FCC and Congress fail to deregulate. ' 46 The cases
suggest, as Stanley Fish has noted, that "[i]n our legal culture as it is pres-
ently constituted, if one yells 'free speech' in a crowded courtroom and
makes it stick, the case is over."' 4' But how did the telephone companies
make it stick?
That crucial question remains unanswered. The Cable Act-telco cases
suggest that the power of constitutional arguments may be responsive to
prevailing public policy and to gaming by industries frustrated by the gla-
cial pace of administrative and legislative reform. Turner I and II would
not dictate otherwise. For while the Supreme Court has said that the power
of constitutional challenges depends upon the purpose of the challenged
law (as determined by Congress), the Court did not say how to properly
determine congressional purpose.
Clearly then the Cable Act-telco cases could have gone the other
way--as could have Turner I or II. Indeed, the Cable Act-telco cases dem-
onstrate the absence of any grand, unifying constitutional jurisprudence.
The First Amendment power is both uncertain and situational.
144. See Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond?-Turner Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (disagreeing with First Amendment
challenges to economic regulations as "Lochnerizing" and arguing for presumptive applica-
tion of strict scrutiny because "[w]e should not assume that we can easily or meaningfully
distinguish, for First Amendment purposes, inappropriate content regulation of the media
from what appears to be largely economic or structural regulation.").
145. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in THE POETICAL
WORKS OF COLERIDGE, SHELLEY, AND KEATS 60-66 (Crissy & Markley 1852) (1798).
146. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1023 n.27 (providing an example of "the extent to which
the First Amendment has become a routine part of the opposition to ordinary economic
regulation." (citing Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir.
1996))).
147. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too,
in DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES 231, 235 (Paul Berman ed., 1992).
148. Turner Il, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997); see also Bhagwat, supra note 7 (asserting that
content neutrality is determined by the purpose of the challenged law).
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